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Abstract 
 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution revealed a profound interconnection 
among all life forms.  Species could no longer be thought of as discreet and 
static entities separate from other life forms or the environment they inhabit.  
As such, the advent of evolutionary theory marked an important moment in 
the history of ecological thinking, as people were forced to consider their 
biological connection to each and every life form.  In The Island of Dr. Moreau 
(1896), H. G. Wells presents an imaginative rendering of the implications of 
evolutionary theory.  He describes a world where the boundaries separating 
humans, animals, and the environment become permeable.  The novel’s 
engagement with evolutionary theory effectively deconstructs an essentialist 
conception of identity, demonstrating how our biological connection to other 
life forms alters the way we think about ourselves and the planet.  In this 
way, The Island of Dr. Moreau proves an important text for considering the 
profound shift in perspective that is required to think in a truly ecological 
manner. 
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Evolution and Ecological Thought in 
 
The Island of Dr. Moreau 
 
Written forty years after Charles Darwin’s groundbreaking work On The 
Origin Of Species (1859), H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) 
presents an imaginative rendering of the implications of the theory of 
evolution.  The novel tells the story of Edward Prendick who, after a 
shipwreck, finds himself stranded on an island populated with grotesque 
creatures exhibiting both animal and human traits.  Prendick eventually 
learns that these creatures are the result of surgical experiments conducted 
by Dr. Moreau, a rogue scientist who has retreated to the island with his 
assistant Montgomery to make humans out of animals.  The novel 
exemplifies how evolutionary theory challenged late-Victorian notions of life 
on the planet.  According to Darwin, species were only “strongly marked 
varieties” (374), and their distinctions the result of a categorical imposition 
on the part of society.  The grotesque forms of Dr. Moreau’s creatures allowed 
Wells a way of demonstrating that Darwin’s theory rendered an essentialist 
conception of identity obsolete.  Under evolutionary theory, the identity of 
individual life forms necessarily includes a host of contextual factors, 
including other life forms and the environment.  The novel reveals the vast 
interconnectedness in and among life forms through its deconstruction of 
traditional boundaries, both between species as well as between life forms 
and their environment.  As a result, the text de-centers human perspective 
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and forces Prendick into an ecologically “minded” way of viewing the world.  I 
argue that The Island of Dr. Moreau’s imaginative engagement with the 
theory of evolution gives rise to an ecological understanding of reality, 
helping us to re-imagine ourselves beyond the confines of a pre-evolutionary 
paradigm.   
An Evolutionary Identity 
 
The profound social, political, and economic changes that Britain experienced 
in the nineteenth century altered the way people thought of themselves in 
relation to the world.  By the end of the century, Britain had become the 
largest economic power and had colonized a quarter of the globe.  Its own 
population grew by three hundred percent, as people migrated en masse to 
urban centers where they found jobs as industrial wage laborers.  The rise in 
industrialization ushered in a consumer-based market economy, as new 
products and services became available to large portions of society.  
According to the Broadview Anthology of British Literature (Concise Edition, 
Volume B), “rail travel, the advent of the telegraph, daily newspapers, and 
the manufacture and import of goods via steamships from all over the globe 
collapsed time and space, and flooded the homes of the affluent with new 
luxuries and conveniences” (Black et al. 499, 500).  The expanding market 
economy and rapidly globalizing world transformed the structure of everyday 
life in England, causing its citizens to reconsider cultural identities.   
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These fundamental changes in society led to rigidly defined roles based 
on gender, class, and race—roles that reflected the changing economic 
relations during this period that required individuals to perform specific 
tasks in specific locations.  This represented a dramatic departure from the 
past agrarian social structure that demanded individuals perform several 
different duties throughout the day, and not necessarily in a single location.  
As a result, late Victorians began “to think about identity in terms of 
oppositions: male and female, rich and poor, black and white,” and, more 
than that, to consider such identities as fixed and unchangeable (Black et al. 
523).  This essentialist conception of identity offered a clear sense of order 
and purpose during a time of monumental and unprecedented change. 
In addition to these socioeconomic changes, advances in the sciences 
also influenced the way identity was viewed during this period.  Rather than 
reinforcing an essentialist view of identity, however, many of these scientific 
discoveries actually challenged it.  In particular, Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
which posited that life forms change over the course of time according to 
natural selection, and proposed a common biological relationship among all 
life forms on the planet.  Under evolutionary theory, humans could no longer 
see themselves as fundamentally distinct and separate from other species 
(Richter 3).  Moreover, Darwin called into question the clear-cut 
demarcations underlying an essentialist worldview, challenging cultural 
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beliefs that served to organize and comprehend a world growing increasingly 
large and complex.  
The possibilities and implications stemming from evolutionary theory 
invariably found their way into Victorian literature.  According to Michael R. 
Page, Wells was the first writer to explicitly engage the theory of evolution in 
his series of scientific romances written in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century.  Among these was The Island of Dr. Moreau (Page 149).  Page 
attributes Wells’s engagement with Darwin to the time he spent at The 
Normal School of Science in London between 1884 and 1887, studying under 
T. H. Huxley, a famed biologist and fierce advocate of Darwinian evolution.  
Wells himself wrote that Huxley and Darwin both “belong to the same 
aristocracy as Plato and Aristotle and Galileo” (“Experiment in 
Autobiography” 163).  Huxley’s vision of life in an evolutionary paradigm had 
a profound effect on Wells.  According to Page, “it was the Huxleyan vision of 
the cosmos and humanity’s place in it that was to drive his imagination 
during the period of the scientific romances and beyond” (Page 150).   
Huxley had a particularly “austere” vision of the cosmos.  He posited 
the idea that “humanity may be just another biological mechanism in a cold 
uncaring universe” (Page 150).  This sentiment is expressed also in an article 
published by Wells in 1891 titled “The Rediscovery of the Unique,” one of his 
first writings to garner public recognition. According to the biographer John 
Hammond, the essay reflects the influence Huxley had on Wells’s 
	   	   Boyle	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evolutionary worldview and encompasses many of the attitudes Wells would 
hold throughout his life (34).  In particular, Hammond cites the “troubled 
awareness of a universe in which there can be no certainties” as one of the 
main themes that would inform much of Wells’s writing throughout his 
career (34).    
While “The Rediscovery of the Unique” acknowledges a profound 
uncertainty in the universe, much of its discussion centers on how identity is 
perceived within such a universe.  As alluded to in the title, the essay focuses 
on the unique constitution of each and every phenomenon.  Wells asserts that 
“[a]ll being is unique, or, nothing is strictly like anything else.  It implies 
therefore that we only arrive at the idea of similar beings by an unconscious 
or deliberate disregard of an infinity of small differences” (“Rediscovery” 23).   
Wells explains how each individual animal displays its own unique 
differences from all other animals of the same kind.  He goes on to explain 
that all phenomena is unique, from “bricks, coins, marbles” to “the shape of 
the earth’s orbit and the earth’s velocity” (“Rediscovery 26).  He laments 
man’s tendency to group phenomena together through the use of language 
and numbers, arguing that evolution reveals a more dynamic and complex 
world in which each and every form is utterly unique:  “The period of darkest 
ignorance, when men turned their backs on nature and believed in mystic 
numbers, has long passed away….  The work of Darwin and Wallace [makes] 
the clear assertion of the uniqueness of living things” (“Rediscovery” 30).  
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Wells claims that in an evolving world, where life forms change over time in 
an indeterminate manner, we are forced to recognize the unique and 
altogether singular constitution of everything.   
Wells acknowledges that even if we know that life forms possess an 
“infinity of small differences,” this doesn’t mean we can perceive those 
differences.  The closer we look at the world, he argues, the more it becomes 
mysterious and withdrawn from human perception, precluding the possibility 
of any absolute truth: 
Science is a match that man has just got alight.  He 
thought he was in a room…and that his light would 
be reflected from and display walls inscribed with 
wonderful secrets and pillars carved with 
philosophical systems wrought into harmony.  It is 
a curious sensation, now that the preliminary 
splutter is over and the flame burns up clear, to see 
his hands lit and just a glimpse of himself and the 
patch he stands on visible, and around him, in 
place of all that human comfort and beauty he 
anticipated—darkness still. (“Rediscovery” 31) 
 
This passage reflects what Hammond refers to as the essay’s “troubled 
awareness of a universe in which there can be no certainties” (34).  But Wells 
does not necessarily present this “awareness” in a negative light.  Rather, he 
asserts that our recognition of the uniqueness of being will “restore 
providences and unverified assertions to the stock of credible things, and 
liberty to the human imagination” (“Rediscovery” 22).  When we fail to 
acknowledge life’s fundamental diversity, he writes, we “blind [ourselves] to 
the fact that every moment is a miracle and mystery” (“Rediscovery” 26).  
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Wells felt that evolutionary theory opened the door to an entirely different 
way of conceiving of life on the planet.  The “awareness” that Hammond 
refers to extends beyond what the future might hold in an evolving world to 
include the very nature of identity in all life forms, man being no exception.  
For Wells, the understanding of life itself had become more enigmatic and 
shrouded in mystery.  
At first glance, Wells’s understanding of identity in an evolutionary 
framework might appear to contradict the proposition that all life forms 
share a common biological relationship.  Indeed, his assertion of the 
unrepeatable uniqueness of each and every life form seems antithetical to 
any notion of commonality.  But we have to recognize the difference between 
the uniqueness of forms, on one hand, and the differences and similarities 
that are selectively imposed by man.  For Wells, language cannot convey life’s 
“infinity of small differences”—differences that, in fact, elude our cognitive 
grasp.  Instead, language causes humanity to “slur over uniqueness, and 
lump similar looking beings together” (“Rediscovery” 26).  Distinctions among 
life forms, then, become convenient assignations and, to some extent, 
arbitrary.  For Wells, language has no essential connection to what it 
presumes to represent.  It falls short in its project to fully convey a vast and 
changing reality.  This is made clear by the fact that he originally titled his 
essay, “The Fallacy of the Common Noun” (“Rediscovery” 22).  Wells 
disparages “strictly logical people” who assume that “words…are reliable 
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tools, instruments of steel.”  Words, he explains, “are rather like a saw or an 
axe of ice when the thermometer fluctuates about zero centigrade” 
(“Rediscovery” 27).  As they were applied in late-Victorian society, language 
and numbers only served to obscure the emergence of an evolutionary 
understanding, contributing to society’s “neat little picture of a universe of 
souls made up of passions and principles in bodies made of atoms, all put 
together so neatly and wound up at the creation” (“Rediscovery” 30).  
In this regard, Wells’s critique of language anticipates Derrida’s theory 
of deconstruction.  Darwin also aligns with Derrida in the sense that his 
theory of evolution deconstructs a pre-evolutionary understanding of the 
structure of species.  Darwin addresses this point in On the Origin of Species: 
“On the view that species are only strongly-marked varieties, and that each 
species first existed as a variety, we can see why no line of demarcation can 
be drawn between species, commonly supposed to have been produced by 
special acts of creation” (Darwin 374).  Darwin demonstrated that species do 
not exist in and of themselves when put to the test of evolutionary theory.  He 
found that in order for speciation to occur, the set of traits that will later 
characterize a new species must appear more than one time in more than one 
life form, before they can be said to constitute a new species.  In effect, the 
search for the original moment when a species first appears equates to a 
search for the non-existence of that species, rendering its origin an absence.  
Ironically, what On the Origin of Species reveals is that there is no origin, 
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effectively dismantling the taxonomic structure of species by deconstructing 
its center (i.e. origin) and boundaries (“Ecology As Text” 6) 
In the same way that evolutionary theory challenges essentialist 
conceptions of identity, Derridian deconstruction challenges the identity of 
texts.  In both cases, the relationship between signifier and signified is called 
into question.  As it relates to text, Derrida engages Saussure’s structuralism 
to demonstrate that the meaning of words arises from its place in a larger 
linguistic structure.  Words are meaningful only in relation to other words 
they stand in contrast to within that structure.  This difference is what 
allows their meaning to exist.  Thus, the structure of language becomes 
paramount in the production of meaning, as the signified behind the signifier 
is shown to have no intrinsic meaning.  In other words, the context 
surrounding individual words becomes just as essential to the comprehension 
of the meaning of those words as the words themselves.  Words and their 
meaning are always shaped by the context that surrounds them, making the 
meaning of each word unique and different depending on its context.   
The importance of context in the comprehension of meaning is not 
simply a theoretical nominalism.  In his essay “Ecology As Text, Text as 
Ecology” Timothy Morton discusses what is meant by deconstruction’s 
illumination of the relevance of context.  “The text-context distinction is only 
an interpretive convenience.  It is not that texts refer to other texts, or coexist 
with them—rather, texts are other texts: texting is the differential process by 
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which and as which texts exist as such” (my emphasis) (2).  Morton argues 
that context does not merely shed light on the meaning of a text, but rather it 
is an intrinsic part of that meaning.  Thus, deconstruction does not render 
the boundaries between text and context obsolete; rather, it brings them into 
the fold.  Boundaries become another part of the meaning-making process. 
Morton describes boundaries as “thick, permeable, folded into 
[themselves], fragile, teeming with parasites, like skin” (“Ecology As Text” 2).  
As such, they serve an important purpose; they negotiate the reciprocity 
between the individual unit, whether that be text or species, and its context.  
It follows then that de-essentializing identity does not necessarily render it 
empty or vacuous, but rather opens up possibilities as to what it might be.  
For instance, the identity of life forms might include a host of contextual 
factors contributing to its existence, despite how they may appear to the 
perceptive faculties of humans.  Both Wells and Morton recognize that 
identity is understood by and through its context. 
In the final analysis, evolution reconfigures how the identity of 
individual life forms should be constituted.  No longer discreet and static 
entities, life forms become part of the context that surrounds them.  Such a 
view lends itself to the fundamental precepts of an ecological paradigm.  
Morton elaborates on this idea by turning to the theory of symbiosis, which 
explores “the relationships between different life forms at all scales.  
Symbionts exist within us, not just around us (endosymbiosis)—we are not 
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ourselves, if by that we mean independent and singular beings, but are made 
up of others” (“Ecology As Text” 7).  In other words, “individual” life forms 
include other life forms in and around them in order to exist, revealing, in a 
straightforward material way, how any conceptualization of identity must 
account for this fact.  Ecology, like evolution, requires an expansion of how we 
conceive of life on the planet.  Whether we are looking at texts or life forms, 
identity includes a sense of the interconnections that define them. 
 
Deconstructing Identity in The Island of Dr. Moreau  
 
Insofar as the discovery of evolution revealed how interconnectedness among 
life forms changes how we think of identity, The Island of Dr. Moreau 
presents an ecological vision that is altogether different from that which 
positions identity and perspective outside of this interconnected reality.  The 
novel accomplishes this by complicating traditional boundary distinctions, 
creating a world in which all life forms are entangled, demonstrating what 
happens when perspective cannot be separated from the context that 
constitutes it.  John Glendening describes entanglement as it is presented in 
the novel:  
It entails the commingling of objects, processes, and 
qualities that strike the mind as incompatible or 
antagonistic because they upset boundaries and 
categories; and it points to the limits of knowledge, 
since the mind, caught in the very processes it tries 
to understand, is continually confounded by 
contingencies. (41) 
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Consequently, as the novel “commingles” many of its “objects” and “qualities,” 
the environmental context infiltrates Prendick’s perspective.  In this way, Dr. 
Moreau de-centers human perspective, forcing Prendick (and the reader) to 
acknowledge how an evolutionary paradigm implicates the very way in which 
we are able to think of the world.  The contingency of the human species in 
an evolutionary framework applies not just to our existence as a species, but 
also to our ability to engage cognitively with the world.  As part of an 
ecologically interconnected world, we’re denied a vantage point outside of this 
intrinsic connection.  As Timothy Morton states, “there is no meta-position” 
(“Ecological Thought” 17). Through the text’s deconstruction of boundaries, 
then, Dr. Moreau reveals how our ecological interconnectedness informs the 
perspective we bring to the world we inhabit. 
An important way the novel accomplishes this task is by focusing on 
Prendick’s identity. Prendick’s identity is initially presented as something 
empty or vacuous.  In the introduction, Prendick’s nephew Charles describes 
how his uncle is thought to be “demented” after returning from his year on 
the island following the shipwreck of The Lady Vain: “the psychologists who 
looked at his case considered it a curious instance of the lapse of memory 
consequent upon physical and mental stress” (5).  Charles mentions that 
Prendick himself “alleged that his mind was a blank from the moment of his 
escape from the Lady Vain,” (5), suggesting an absence or a state that is yet 
to be formed.  His identity appears even less certain when in the first chapter 
	   	   Boyle	  	  
	   15	  
he does not divulge his name, and later on he refers to himself as “human 
flotsam” (17).  To the extent that Prendick is introduced without a clearly 
defined sense of self, his identity becomes a “blank” for the story to be written 
on.  As Kimberly Jackson argues, “Prendick’s experiences are things which 
are injected or inserted into him” (23).  This foreshadows how the novel will 
showcase boundary transgressions between Prendick and his environment.    
We first see the crossing of traditional boundaries when Prendick is in 
the lifeboat with two other men following the shipwreck.  Out of provisions, 
they decide to draw straws in order to determine which of the three will be 
cannibalized so that the others may survive.  After one of the men draws the 
short straw, he begins to fight the third man, causing them both to tumble 
out of the lifeboat to their deaths.  Prendick laughs, only to wonder why: “the 
laugh caught me suddenly like a thing from without” (9).  As something from 
“without” that suddenly “caught” him, the laugh functions to momentarily 
dissolve the external/internal boundary as it applies to Prendick’s identity.  
Subtle as it may be, this moment illustrates how Wells upsets boundaries in 
the novel.  In this instance, the boundary in Pendrick’s mind between “within 
and without” becomes permeable, forcing the reader to reconsider Prendick’s 
relationship to his context.   
The disruption of traditional boundaries becomes even clearer as 
Prendick continues to recount his experience aboard the lifeboat: 
And even as I lay there I saw with no more interest 
than if it had been a picture, a sail come up 
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towards me over the skyline.  My mind must have 
been wandering, and yet I remember all that 
happened quite distinctly. I remember how my 
head swayed with the seas, and the horizon with 
the sail above it danced up and down.  But I also 
remember as distinctly that I had a persuasion that 
I was dead, and that I thought what a jest it was 
that they should come too late by such a little to 
catch me in my body. (9) 
 
This passage complicates several boundary distinctions.  Prendick’s mind 
“wanders,” but not absently because he claims to remember what happened 
“quite distinctly,” giving the impression that Prendick’s identity has 
separated down Cartesian lines.  His mind, not his body, surveys the scene 
from a distance, while his corporeal head moves in unison with the sea.  The 
horizon, something that usually provides a stable reference point, “dances” 
vertically up and down.  All of this leads Prendick to make the confusing and 
contradictory statement that he is simultaneously dead and “caught” in his 
body.  On the surface, this scene works to convey Prendick’s altered state of 
mind and near-death experience.  But it’s done in such a way as to transgress 
the boundaries separating mind, body, and environment.  The suggestion 
here is that Prendick’s identity cannot easily be distinguished from what is 
taking place around him.   
 Another way the novel foregrounds the disruption of traditional 
identity boundaries is through Dr. Moreau’s vivisection experiments.  His 
creatures represent an amalgamation of human and animal forms, defying 
conventional categorical distinctions and challenging Prendick’s conceptual 
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boundaries.  As much as the creatures can be defined as both man and 
animal, they also exist as neither.  Prendick registers this paradox when he 
first encounters one of the creatures, even though at the time he is unaware 
it is anything but human:  “I had never beheld such a repulsive and 
extraordinary face before, and yet—if the contradiction is credible—I 
experienced at the same time an odd feeling that in some way I had already 
encountered exactly the features and gestures that now amazed me” (14).  
The contradiction Prendick registers is credible to the extent that species do 
not exist as discreet and static entities in an evolutionary framework, since 
there is nothing essential organizing their taxonomic differences. 
The contradiction Prendick experiences reflects Freud’s idea of “the 
uncanny.”  In his 1919 essay by the same name, Freud examines how the 
uncanny bears the imprint of both the familiar and unfamiliar.  Freud 
ventures that “[t]he uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between 
fantasy and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of 
something that we have until now considered imaginary” (151).  He adds to 
this that “only if there is a conflict in judgment can the feeling arise” (156), 
explaining that “the uncanny arises from superannuated modes of thought” 
(157).  Prendick experiences the uncanny insofar as he registers two different 
species at the same time, challenging his conception of what is possible in 
reality.  This is the conflict in judgment that Freud describes.  The 
“superannuated modes of thought” are the pre-evolutionary modes of 
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thinking that regard species as distinct and separate entities.  The novel 
highlights Prendick’s uncanny experience as a way of illustrating the 
profound shift in thinking required of evolutionary theory, namely, the 
acknowledgment that the appearance of distinct and separate species belies 
their interconnectedness. 
Dr. Moreau’s expressed motivation behind his experiments also reveals 
the fallacy of an essentialist understanding of identity.  Moreau sees 
vivisection as a way to explore the latent possibilities inherent in a non-
essentialist framework of evolutionary theory.  When explaining the purpose 
of his experiments to Prendick, he states: “It all lay on the surface of practical 
anatomy years ago, but no one had the temerity to touch it” (71, 72).   Wells 
himself discusses these possibilities in a scientific article titled “The Limits of 
Individual Plasticity,” published a year before The Island of Dr. Moreau: 
 
We overlook only too often the fact that a living 
being may also be regarded as raw material, as 
something plastic, something that may be shaped 
and altered, that this, possibly, may be added and 
that eliminated, and the organism as a whole 
developed far beyond its apparent possibilities. (36) 
 
 
This passage mirrors Moreau’s explanation of the purpose of his experiments.  
Again, speaking to Prendick, he states: “These creatures you have seen are 
animals carven and wrought into new shapes.  To that—the study of the 
plasticity of living forms—my life has been devoted” (71).  He reiterates this 
sentiment later: “I wanted—it was the only thing I wanted—to find out the 
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extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape” (75).   Moreau’s desire to explore 
plasticity, coupled with his view of individual species as “raw material,” 
reflects an understanding that the boundaries used to distinguish among 
species are permeable.  In this light, identity no longer exists as something 
fixed, independent, singular and stable.  “External” factors are also part of its 
composition.    
Once the boundaries separating species become permeable, all the 
traits normally associated with individual species become mutable.  Species, 
then, cannot necessarily be expected to look or behave in any specific manner.  
Both Wells, in his article on plasticity, and Dr. Moreau, in his explanation of 
his experiments, address the possibility of changing the mental and 
psychological structure of life forms.  In fact, the following passage can be 
found in both the essay and the novel: “we find the promise of a possibility of 
replacing old inherent instincts by new suggestions, grafting upon or 
replacing the inherited fixed ideas” (“Moreau” 73, “Individual Plasticity” 39).  
The ability to change “instincts” and substitute “inherited fixed ideas” 
nullifies an essentialist conception of species, challenging many of the 
stringent Victorian views regarding identity.  In an evolving world, species 
can no longer be counted on to signify specific physical and mental traits. 
In this way, Dr. Moreau’s vivisected creatures also convey the 
frightening and unknown possibilities inherent in an indeterminate universe.  
At one point, Prendick recognizes this: “that these man-like creatures were in 
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truth only bestial monsters, mere grotesque travesties of men, filled me with 
a vague uncertainty of their possibilities that was far worse than any definite 
fear” (8).  Prendick recognizes that when life forms do not exist as distinct 
and separate entities, their behaviors are unpredictable.  Wells draws 
attention to this aspect of evolution through the vivisected figure of the 
monster, which evokes a sense of the uncanny.  Monsters are composed of 
familiar features, but the configuration of these features is unfamiliar.  
Wells’s choice to use the figure of the monster aligns him with both Darwin 
and Derrida insofar as they also use the monster to convey a similar 
meaning.   
Colin Nazhone Milburn discusses both Darwin’s and Derrida’s use of 
the monster figure.  He argues that they “enact a critique of artifactual 
constructions of nature that disrespects boundaries and emphasizes the 
deviancies, the perversions, the mutations, and the monstrosities of the 
world” (604).  Milburn reads Darwin’s use of the monster as a way of 
representing how the process of natural selection operates: 
Darwin’s main concern is ultimately not with 
radical variations like monsters, but rather with 
the small gradual differences that accumulate over 
generations and by which he understands evolution 
to have been accomplished historically.  But his 
argument needs the monster as evidence 
observable in time, as a phenomenon of extreme 
transmissible difference not requiring the 
imagination of millennia to suggest the movements 
of evolution: it supplies a sort of freak-show 
vividness and tangibility to his argument. (607) 
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The “freak-show vividness” Milburn refers to is exactly what Moreau’s 
creatures provide in the novel.  Their multiple, un-categorizable identities 
force Prendick and the reader to acknowledge that life forms do not 
necessarily have to look or behave in any specific manner, and that pre-
evolutionary conceptual boundaries fail to reveal an accurate depiction of 
reality.  As the conception of identity expands, it becomes more inclusive of 
what Milburn calls “the perversions, deviancies, and mutations.”  These 
features take on a greater significance in terms of understanding the 
complexity of an evolving world.   
 Milburn praises Derrida’s use of the monster to the extent that it 
exemplifies the project of deconstruction: “At once outside nature and inside 
nature, the monster is a perfect deconstructive icon, collapsing distinctions 
with impunity” (605).  Derrida himself speaks to this issue: “one must 
produce what in fact looks like a discursive monster so that the analysis [of 
norms] will be a practical effect, so that people will be forced to become aware 
of the history of normality” (386).  Moreau’s grotesque monsters work to this 
end. They reveal to us that our understanding of a singular and independent 
self is predicated on a system of categorization based on essentialism—a 
structure that minimizes the unique features of all that surrounds us.  Dr. 
Moreau suggests that identity is not only multifaceted, but that it extends 
beyond the essentialist concept of a discreet self to include the environmental 
context in which it exists.  Specifically, Moreau’s monsters demonstrate how 
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a pre-evolutionary paradigm obscures the profound interconnection among all 
life forms.   
 
De-Centering Perspective in an Ecological Paradigm 
 
In his comparison of evolution to the theories of Marx and Freud, Morton 
states that all three “describe processes taking place behind our backs.  We 
can’t see evolution, or the secret of the commodity form, or the unconscious” 
(“Ecological Thought” 65).  In other words, we can never gain a complete 
picture of the mechanics of how evolution operates; we can only view the 
results in retrospect.  If we categorize and name what we perceive without 
recognizing that a portion of what we see eludes us, we run the risk of 
asserting false claims on a world we presume to know.  Like Prendick, we’ll 
stand dumbstruck when we encounter the contradictions that deconstruct the 
reality we thought we knew. 
Wells addresses this issue in “The Rediscovery of the Unique.”  He 
begins by critiquing the methodology of late-Victorian science that privileges 
aggregates and averages in its formulation of results.  This bias overlooks the 
minute variations and unique differences that underlie the slow process of 
evolution.  What’s more, the methodology operates in such a way as to 
present its results as absolute.  Wells describes how this works:   
 
We may call attention to the unreasonable width of 
“margin of experimental error” allowed to 
scientists.  They assert, for instance…[that] 
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hydrogen and oxygen invariably exist in the 
definite and integral ratio of one to eight.  Any 
truthful chemist, if the reader can get one and 
“heckle” him, will confess that the most elaborate 
and accurate analyses of water have given 
fractional and variant results. (“Rediscovery” 28)  
 
 
For Wells, these “fractional and variant results” confirm the unique character 
and constitution of phenomena.  Late-Victorian scientific methodology, he 
argues, fails to acknowledge and consider the presence of variation in any 
meaningful way, resulting in a distorted worldview.  
In Dr. Moreau, Wells calls attention to the limitations of knowledge 
through his use of negative imagery.  Morton defines a negative image as an 
“absence of something ‘there’ ” that “evokes a sense of sheer space,” (“Ecology 
Without Nature” 46).  We find an example of this in one of Prendick’s 
descriptions of Dr. Moreau’s creatures: “I saw with a quivering disgust that it 
was like the face of neither man nor beast, but a mere shock of grey hair, 
with shadowy over-archings to mark the eyes and mouth” (60).  Prendick 
defines the creature in the negative, as neither man nor animal.  Instead of 
having strange eyes and a mouth, it has an obscured semblance of what 
should be a mouth.  Prendick can’t find the words to describe its unique and 
strange qualities.  This incomplete definition illuminates its altogether 
unique composition.  
Another form of negative imagery in the novel can be found in what 
Kimberly Jackson describes as “textual vivisection”.  Jackson argues that 
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vivisection “happens both within the story, in Dr. Moreau’s laboratory, and as 
the ‘operation’ of the text itself.  As Moreau works upon the creatures’ bodies, 
so the text performs vivisection in the language that constitutes it” (21).  This 
textual vivisection occurs in a number of ways, Jackson explains, including 
the manipulation of punctuation.  Jackson counts “at least sixty-seven 
ellipses and almost 250 hyphens” in the novel (23).  The ellipses and hyphens 
break up the smooth flow of the narrative and convey the idea that something 
cannot quite be described.  A good example of this occurs in the chapter “The 
Crying of the Puma.”  When Prendick questions Montgomery about the 
strange features of one of his servants, his dialogue becomes hesitant and 
disjointed: 
“He’s unnatural,” I said.  “There’s something about 
him…Don’t think me fanciful, but it gives me a 
nasty little sensation, a tightening of my muscles, 
when he comes near me.  It’s a touch…of the 
diabolical, in fact.” (37) 
 
In this passage, Prendick never does describe any specific detail about the 
creature, yet the implications of what he means are available to Montgomery 
and the reader.  His description is presented in the negative, evoking the 
incomprehensible strangeness of the creature as experienced by Prendick.    
Morton discusses how an abundance of negative imagery can create its 
own rhythm within a text.  He explains that “[j]ust as words come in phrases, 
imagery comes in clusters,” and “[g]aps between stanzas, and other kinds of 
broken lineation, create tone out of sheer blankness” (“Ecology Without 
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Nature” 45).  The abundance of negative imagery in Dr. Moreau, 
manufactured through descriptions of the creatures as well as the 
manipulation of ellipses and hyphens, creates a tonal resonance that 
communicates an underlying uncertainty.  A good example of this can be 
found in the aforementioned passage in which Prendick first encounters one 
of Moreau’s creatures.  In his description of his experience, the phrase “if the 
contradiction is credible” is offset with hyphens.  The reader recognizes that 
Prendick cannot fully comprehend what he sees, both because of what he says 
and the “broken lineation” that characterizes how he says it.  The tonal 
quality created by the novel’s negative imagery provides a kind of eerie 
background music that reminds readers of what they do not know or cannot 
see. 
 Indeed, uncertainty lies at the heart of what this novel explores, 
namely, the implications of Darwinian theory and all the unknowns and 
possibilities that follow—possibilities that Wells makes tangible in the 
“freak-show vividness” of Moreau’s creatures.  This is not to say that the 
creatures represent literal life forms that evolution might produce, but rather 
that they signify the principle of uncertainty inherent in the evolutionary 
process.   
 In the same way that Wells confuses boundary distinctions separating 
man and animal, he also blurs the conventional lines of demarcation 
separating man and animals from their environment.  This occurs most 
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prominently in the chapter “The Thing in the Forest” when Prendick 
ventures into the thick forest and encounters a number of Dr. Moreau’s 
“failed” experiments.  The chapter begins by emphasizing the abundance of 
vegetation in the forest: 
I strode through the undergrowth that clothed the 
ridge behind the house, scarcely heeding whither I 
went, passed on through the shadow of a thick 
cluster of straight-stemmed trees beyond it, and so 
presently found myself some way on the other side 
of the ridge, and descending towards a streamlet 
that ran through a narrow valley. (39) 
 
The long meandering sentence ushers both Prendick and the reader into the 
dense forest.  Prendick catches a glimpse of one of Moreau’s creatures but the 
thick vegetation obscures his view, limiting his visual perception.  The 
features of the environment, traditionally presented as background setting, 
move into the foreground, preventing Prendick from gaining any clear 
perspective on either his surroundings or the strange creatures that lurk 
there.  Gradually, the forest environment begins to affect not only his vision 
but his mental state as well.  At one point, he states, “it was too hot to think 
elaborately, and presently I fell into a tranquil state midway between dosing 
and waking” (39).  Wells locates Prendick’s state of mind “midway” between 
sleeping and waking, complicating the boundary separating the conscious 
from the unconscious, by blurring the distinction between his thought and 
the heat of the forest.   
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 As the boundaries between Prendick and his environment become 
confused, the environment takes on a more prominent role, complicating 
Prendick’s ability to navigate the forest.  When one of Moreau’s creatures 
begins to stalk him, Prendick tries to locate it in the forest.  But looking for 
the creature, Prendick sees only the forest.  At this point, the boundaries 
separating the creature from the forest blur as well.  Prendick cannot 
differentiate between the presence of the creature and the presence of the 
forest: “The thicket about me became altered to my imagination.  Every 
shadow became something more than a shadow, became an ambush, every 
rustle became a threat.  Invisible things seemed watching me” (41).  Wells 
anthropomorphizes the environment, endowing it with agency.  It is capable 
of watching Prendick: “I turned suddenly and stared at the uncertain trees 
behind me.  One black shadow seemed to leap into another” (45).  As the 
creature continues to stalk Prendick, it blends in almost imperceptibly with 
the environment: “Then, suddenly traversing a little glade, I saw with an 
unpleasant start two clumsy legs among the trees,” and “the head and body 
were obscured by a tangle of creeper” (43).  What Prendick sees here is an 
image of hybridization—half creature, half creeper.   
Prendick describes the relationship between the forest and the 
creature as an “interlacing network,” and eventually he describes everything 
as a “green confusion” (43).  The “green confusion” speaks to the prominence 
of the environment in what Prendick perceives.  The environment is not 
	   	   Boyle	  	  
	   28	  
merely an inert backdrop.  Rather, it dominates the foreground, erasing 
distinctions between itself, Prendick, and the creature.  Prendick alludes to 
the disruption of boundaries around him when he states: “I could see 
nothing—or else I could see too much” (45).  The idea that seeing “nothing” 
equates with seeing “too much” underscores Prendick’s inability to 
distinguish among all the phenomena before him, his own perspective 
included. 
The “green confusion” experienced by Prendick is one of many images 
of formlessness found in the chapter.  In each case, the formlessness is 
enacted through a confusion of boundaries.  As night begins to descend in the 
forest, Prendick fears “the idea of being overtaken in the open by the 
darkness, and all that darkness might conceal.”  He describes how “[c]olour 
vanished from the world, the tree tops rose against the luminous blue sky in 
inky silhouette, and all below that outline melted into formless blackness” 
(44).  Here, Wells describes a world losing its distinction, as Prendick is 
indeed “overtaken” by his context.  Everything around him melts into the 
dark.  In this way, Prendick resembles the man at the end of “The Re-
discovery of the Unique” who only finds darkness in his attempt to illuminate 
the truth of the world he inhabits.  Thus, the contingency of his perspective is 
exposed.  This is consistent with an ecological paradigm where everything is 
situated in relation to everything else.    
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This chapter brings to light an important distinction involving the way 
we experience the world.  When boundary distinctions blur, we too perceive 
the world as a kind of “green confusion.”  The language we use to organize the 
world is not necessarily flawed simply because it is used in such a way as to 
obscure or distort the fundamental interconnectedness of life forms.  Rather, 
our interconnectedness demands that we acknowledge the way in which our 
perception and understanding of the world are in fact part of the 
interconnectedness.  We distinguish between life forms and elevate these 
distinctions with the authority of language, all the while implicitly asserting 
some degree of objective truth.  But this tends to overlook the vast complexity 
of each and every unique phenomenon that we seek to categorize.  
 Wells includes images that demonstrate that while the contingency of 
perspective precludes us from understanding the world absolutely, what we 
do see and experience provides endless possibilities of exploration.  In a world 
where identity becomes expansive, each life form reveals its connection to 
other life forms as well as to the environmental context that surrounds it. 
 Wells illustrates this in the forest scene when Prendick becomes 
overwhelmed by the “green confusion.”  In the midst of all the confused 
boundaries and formlessness that he experiences, he pauses momentarily to 
examine a fungus: “I was startled by a great patch of vivid scarlet on the 
ground, and going up to it found it to be a peculiar fungus branched and 
corrugated like a foliaceous lichen, but deliquescing into slime at the touch” 
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(41).  This striking image illustrates the way life forms are interconnected.  
Many fungi maintain important symbiotic relationships—either mutualistic 
or parasitic—with plants, animals, insects, and even other fungal species.  
The “branched” and “corrugated” formation indicates the way the scarlet 
fungus reaches out and connects with the world around it.  The image here is 
clear and detailed.  The words used to describe it—“foliaceous” and 
“deliquescing”—underscore the complexity and sophistication of this 
particular life form.   
 There is another moment in this chapter when Prendick pauses to 
notice the particularity of life forms.  Shortly after he remarks that he wants 
to escape the forest and “get a clear space about me,” he begins frantically 
moving through the bushes in order to find his way out.  Again, though, he 
stops to observe the various life forms that surround him: 
I stopped just in time to prevent myself emerging 
upon an open space.  It was a kind of glade in the 
forest made by a fall; seedlings were already 
starting up to struggle for the vacant space, and 
beyond, the dense growth of stems and twining 
vines and splashes of fungus and flowers closed in 
again. (41) 
 
Just prior to this moment, Prendick had encountered a number of Moreau’s 
creatures that he described in detail: “They were naked, save for swathings of 
scarlet cloth about their middles, and their skins were of a dull pinkish drab 
colour…They had fat heavy chinless faces, retreating foreheads, and a scant 
bristly hair upon their head” (41).   
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This is an important moment for Prendick in that he thinks he realizes 
that Moreau’s vivisection experiments involve turning men into animals.  
Ultimately, his realization will prove incorrect, further demonstrating how 
his experience in the forest only leads to more confusion.  Prendick’s 
perplexity is extended beyond the “green confusion” in the forest to include 
the nature of Moreau’s experiments.  At every turn, it seems, he cannot reach 
a satisfactory understanding of his circumstance.  His anxiety manifests 
itself in the dramatic shifts of perspective that characterize the chapter.  
Prendick’s perspective vacillates between the general and the particular.  
One moment he’s trying to untangle the “green confusion” and parse out the 
individual features of the forest.  The next moment he’s examining the 
minute details of a specific and singular life form.  In both cases, he is unable 
to gain any conclusive knowledge about anything.       
  The juxtaposition of these different perspectives demonstrates an 
important point regarding an ecological perspective according to Morton.  In 
an interconnected world where our perspective is situated from within, “We 
can’t see everywhere.  We can’t see everywhere all at once….When we look at 
x, we can’t look at y” (“The Ecological Thought” 22).  Prendick examines the 
forest and he examines the fungus, but he cannot examine both at once.  
Whereas he can perceive a creature as either man or animal, he is unable to 
see it as both at the same moment.  This lies at the heart of what confounds 
him throughout the novel.  It reflects Morton’s point that evolution occurs 
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slowly over time, and we can only understand it in the abstract.  That being 
said, our perceptual experience of material reality is no less “real” than the 
reality of the evolutionary process.  What we have to recognize is the degree 
to which the incompleteness of our perceptual experience informs our 
understanding of the world.  Since we cannot see everywhere at once nor see 
the evolutionary process, we must relinquish altogether the possibility of a 
meta-position from which to organize and understand the world, rather than 
simply positing it in terms of some future possibility.  Because our 
understanding of reality includes the perspective that constitutes it, this 
necessarily de-centers human perspective.  But not just nominally.  A de-
centered perspective reveals not that we don’t have access to a meta-position, 
but that there isn’t a meta-position.  The absence of a meta-position, then, 
precludes any absolute essentialist claim on reality.  
 In lieu of an essentialist conception of reality, ecological 
interconnection re-contextualizes how we understand identity as it relates to 
ourselves, other life forms, and the environment we inhabit. Without the aid 
of a meta-position, we must allow for each and every feature of reality.  We 
must adjust our thinking to the flux—the endless unfolding of phenomena.  
Morton describes how ecological thinking is “thinking big—as big as possible, 
and maybe even bigger than that, bigger than we can conceive” (The 
Ecological Thought 20).  This kind of perspective includes a willingness to 
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incorporate more and more within its purview, acknowledging that this 
process of inclusion will continue indefinitely and never conclude absolutely. 
Morton questions the overly positive and celebratory tone of a lot of 
environmental rhetoric when he asks: “where does this leave negativity… 
ambiguity, darkness, irony, fragmentation, and sickness? Are these simply 
non-ecological categories?” (“Ecological Thought” 16).  He critiques a way of 
thinking that seeks to weed out any elements or aspects that don’t present 
the natural world in a beautiful and positive light.  Wells, on the other hand, 
highlights these features.  Fungus, monsters, darkness, negativity, and 
fragmentation all bear on the perspective of Prendick.   
 In its exploration of the implications of evolutionary theory, The Island 
of Dr. Moreau asserts an inclusive ecological perspective.  In the words of 
Glendening, the text opens itself up to the “chance”, “contingency”, 
“indeterminacy”, and “confusion” that an evolutionary worldview embraces.  
But it does so in a way that does not cast the elements in a purely negative 
light.  Rather, they are presented as necessary components of the 
evolutionary process as perceived by humans.  Whereas late-Victorian society 
wrestled with the threat evolution posed to its essentialist paradigm, Wells 
believed Darwin’s theory represented nothing less than “man’s final 
emancipation from rigid reasonableness” (“Rediscovery” 29).  For Wells, 
evolutionary theory marked the restoration of liberty to the human 
imagination” (“Rediscovery” 22).      
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As we might expect, the novel ends on a note of ambiguity, leaving the 
reader with a sense of inconclusiveness and indeterminacy of meaning.  The 
last we see of Prendick, he is looking into the dark immensity of the night 
sky, ruminating on his change of perspective in the wake of his experience on 
the island with Moreau’s creatures—emblematic of the shift in worldview 
necessitated by Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Back in England now, Prendick 
decides to abandon biology in favor of chemistry and astronomy in his pursuit 
of the “vast and eternal laws of the universe” (131).  His choice of chemistry 
and astronomy is noteworthy inasmuch as it recalls the forest scene in which 
he shifted perspective between the particular and the general.  The image of 
Prendick in darkness also calls to mind the man at the end of “The 
Rediscovery of the Unique” who lights a match in the dark only to find “in 
place of all that human comfort and beauty he anticipated—darkness still” 
(“Rediscovery” 31).  Any “human comfort and beauty” that accompanies an 
absolute understanding of the world seems no longer possible. 
But the light of the match does illuminate something: the match 
striker catches “a glimpse of himself and the patch he stands on” 
(“Rediscovery” 31). An image of man and his environment.  A suggestion, 
perhaps, of the illumination cast upon the world by the light of evolutionary 
theory and all the possibilities it may hold.   For Prendick, the darkness that 
surrounds him represents “a dim suggestion of the fathomlessness of the 
unique mystery of life” (“Rediscovery” 30).  It is there, he thinks finally, 
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where “whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and its 
hope” (“Moreau” 131).         
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